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CASE NOTES
TORTS-lnterspousal Immunity-Interspousal Immunity
Doctrine Will Not Bar Claims for Intentional Torts
Bounds v. Caudle,
560 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1977).

On March 1, 1971, Mrs. Robbie Bounds died from two gunshot wounds
inflicted during a domestic quarrel with her husband, Dr. L.D. Bounds.
Mrs. Bounds' children by a former marriage brought suit for the wrongful
death' of their mother, and were awarded damages upon a jury finding that
Dr. Bounds intentionally and wrongfully caused Mrs. Bounds' death. The
Corpus Christi Court of Civil Appeals reversed and rendered a take nothing
judgment in the wrongful death action. The court reasoned that since the
doctrine of interspousal tort immunity would have barred any civil action
under article 46722 by Mrs. Bounds had she survived, an action by her
children was also barred.' Held-Reversed and remanded. The rule of
interspousal tort immunity is abolished insofar as it would bar interspousal
claims founded on willful or intentional torts.'
The doctrine of interspousal immunity evolved from the common law
fiction that a husband and wife possessed only one legal identity.' As a
matter of law, the wife was absorbed into the legal personality of her
husband.' Upon marriage, the husband acquired the right to possession
and use of his wife's real and personal property. 7 In addition, he acquired
the right to her choses in action, to the extent that he reduced them to
possession during the marriage by either collecting the award or obtaining
1. The Texas Wrongful Death Statute provides that "[wihen an injury causing the
death of any person, occurring either within or without this state, is caused by the wrongful
act, neglect, carelessness, unskillfulness, or default of another person . . . such persons...
shall be liable in damages for the injuries causing such death." TEx. REV. Ctv. STAT. ANN.
art. 4671 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
2. See TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4672 (Vernon 1952). This statute provides that
"[t]he wrongful act, negligence, carelessness, unskillfulness or default mentioned in the
preceding article must be of such character as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled
the party injured to maintain an action for such injury." Id.
3. Bounds v. Caudle, 549 S.W.2d 438, 442 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi), rev'd, 560
S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1977).
4. Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925, 927 (Tex. 1977).
5. See generally 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 8.10, at 643 (1956); W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 122, at 859 (4th ed. 1971).

6. 1 W.

BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES

441 (3d ed. Cooley 1883). The origin of the unity

concept has been attributed to a statement made by Adam after creation of woman from his
rib: "This is now bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh." Genesis 2:23. Other authorities
point to the early Roman law, feudal law, and the natural law concept of the family where
the wife was under her husband's authority and had no legal personality of her own. See
Damm v. Elyria Lodge No. 465, 107 N.E.2d 337, 341 (Ohio 1952); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS § 122, at 860 (4th ed. 1971).
7. See generally H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 7.1, at
219-20 (1968); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 122, at 860 (4th ed. 1971).
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judgment in a suit in his own name.8 Within this context, the doctrine of
interspousal immunity was the logical extension of the common law unity
fiction. 9 There was not only a "conceptual problem of the single marital
entity suing itself, but also, as a practical matter, the rules of liability
rendered such suits idle exercises."'" Thus, under the traditional common
law concept of conjugal unity, each spouse was precluded both procedurally and substantively from suing the other in tort. Procedurally, the husband would be both plaintiff and defendant, while substantively, the wife
had no personal right of action."
Beginning in 1844, state legislatures, under the pressure of social and
economic progress, enacted Emancipation or Married Women's Acts which
were designed to alleviate some of the disabilities of coverture placed upon
the wife as a result of the unity doctrine.' 2 Although the language in these
statutes lacked uniformity, the basic purpose was to return the married
woman to the legal status she occupied as a femme sole.' 3 Most of these
statutes failed to state whether the doctrine of interspousal immunity was
abrogated by their enactment. 4 The first courts to interpret these statutes
held that although a wife could maintain a suit against her husband for
the protection of her separate property rights, no right of action had been
conferred with respect to personal interspousal torts. 5 The foundation was
8. The wife had no right to sue or be sued without the joinder of her husband, and was
unable to contract in her own name or to own, control, or manage her separate property.
McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARV. L. REv. 1030, 1031-32
(1930).
9. Lewis v. Lewis, 351 N.E.2d 526, 527 (Mass. 1976).
10. Id. at 527-28. See also Rains v. Rains, 46 P.2d 740, 741 (Colo. 1935). If the husband
were the tortfeasor, he could reduce his wife's chose.in action to possession thereby becoming
a plaintiff against himself and entitled to the proceeds. If his wife committed the tort, he
would be joined as a defendant and liable to himself. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS § 122, at 860 (4th ed. 1971).
11. McCurdy, PersonalInjury Torts Between Spouses, 4 ViLL. L.REv. 303, 307 (1959).
At common law . . . the combination of various incidents of marriage, some

substantive, some procedural, some conceptual, made it impossible for one spouse ever
to be held civilly liable as a tortfeasor, inany situation, and without exception, to the
other for any act, antenuptial or during marriage, causing personal injury which would
have been a tort but for marriage.
Id. at 307. See generally Comment, Intrafamily Immunity-The Doctrine and Its Present
Status, 20 BAYLOR L.REv. 27 (1967).
12. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 122, at 861 n.20 (4th ed. 1971).
13. Hinkle, Intrafamily Litigation-Husbandand Wife, 1970 INs. L.J. 133, 133. The acts
were designed to confer upon women a separate legal identity and to give them a separate
legal estate intheir own property. They conferred upon a wife the capacity to sue or be sued
without the joinder of her husband and made the wife separately responsible for her torts
committed against third persons. Self v.Self, 376 P.2d 65, 66, 26 Cal. Rptr. 97, 98 (1962).
See also 1 F.HARPER & F.JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 8.10, at 643 (1956).
14. Comment, Husband and Wife Are Not One: The Marital Relationship In Tort Law,
43 U.M.K.C.L.REv. 334, 336 (1975); see, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 55-401 (Bobbs-Merrill 1971);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
32, § 15 (West 1976); VA. CODE §§ 55-35 to -47 (Michie 1974).
15. The leading case isThompson v.Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910) (assault and bat-
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thus laid for what subsequently became the majority view: that immunity
remained the rule governing personal torts between spouses.' 6 Nevertheless, those jurisdictions which continued to uphold the doctrine of interspousal immunity recognized that the emancipation statutes had eroded
the common law foundation for the doctrine."
The common law historical basis for denying interspousal tort actions
has generally been replaced by various public policy arguments.'" The
principal policy rationale upon which the courts rely is the argument that
personal interspousal tort actions would disrupt the domestic peace and
conjugal harmony of the home." The fear of fraud and collusion between
spouses in cases involving liability insurance frequently has been advanced
as justification for the denial of interspousal actions founded on negligence.1° Judicial concern that the court system would be burdened with
trivial interspousal litigation has been stated as a basis for continued immunity," while the reasoning that abrogation of the doctrine is the province of the legislature and not the courts also has been submitted as a
ground for denying interspousal tort actions." Additionally, courts have
tery), in which the Supreme Court stated: "The [District of Columbia] statute was not
intended to give a right of action as against the husband, but to allow the wife, in her own
name, to maintain actions of tort which at common law must be brought in the joint names
of herself and her husband." Id. at 617; accord, Maine v. James Maine & Sons Co., 201 N.W.
20, 21 (Iowa 1924); Strom v. Strom, 107 N.W. 1047, 1048 (Minn. 1906). The rule that any
statute in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed resulted in most states
holding that the emancipation of married women did not confer upon them the right to sue
their husbands. See Hinkle, Intrafamily Litigation-Husbandand Wife, 1970 INS. L.J. 133,
133.
16. E.g., Amendola v. Amendola, 121 So. 2d 805, 806 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960); Fisher
v. Toler, 401 P.2d 1012, 1015 (Kan. 1965); Ensminger v. Ensminger, 77 So. 2d 308, 310 (Miss.
1955).
17. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 122, at 859-61 (4th ed.
1971); McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARV. L. REv. 1030, 103541'(1930).
18. Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 617-18 (1910); Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304,
307 (1877); Nickerson v. Nickerson, 65 Tex. 281, 285 (1886).
19. In an 1858 decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated: "The flames which
litigation would kindle on the domestic hearth would consume in an instant the conjugal
bond, and bring on a new era indeed-an era of universal discord, of unchastity, of bastardy,
of dissoluteness, of violence, cruelty, and murders." Ritter v. Ritter, 31 Pa. 396, 398 (1858)
(action on a debt); accord, Corren v. Corren, 47 So. 2d 774, 776 (Fla. 1950) (automobile
negligence); Bandfield v. Bandfield, 75 N.W. 287, 288 (Mich. 1898) (infliction of veneral
disease).
20. See, e.g., Harvey v. Harvey, 214 N.W. 305, 306 (Mich. 1927) (automobile negligence);
Newton v. Weber, 196 N.Y.S. 113, 114 (Sup. Ct. 1922) (automobile negligence); Lyons v.
Lyons, 208 N.E.2d 533, 535-36 (Ohio 1965) (automobile negligence). In Newton a New York
court stated that the only reason a wife would want to sue her husband for a negligent tort
was as a raid on the insurance company. Newton v. Weber, 196 N.Y.S. 113, 114 (Sup. Ct.
1922).
21. See Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 617-18 (1910) (assault and battery).
22. E.g., Wright v. Wright, 70 S.E.2d 152, 154 (Ga. Ct. App. 1952) (automobile negli-
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dismissed interspousal tort suits on the theory that the injured spouse has
an adequate remedy at law, either through divorce or criminal prosecution. 3 Finally, in community property jurisdictions, the right of action
between spouses has been denied on the ground that the recovery from the
tortfeasor spouse would be community property and thus would unjustly
enrich the wrongdoer. 4
Texas adopted the common law of England as the rule of decision;
however, in the area of marital rights, the framers of the constitution
attempted to preserve the community property concept of Spanish law
which refuted the common law principle that coverture created a merger
of the wife's legal identity into that of her husband. 25 As early as 1852,
Texas recognized that one spouse might be liable to the other for conversion or trespass against the other spouse's property." In areas other than
property rights, however, the wife continued under the disabilities of coverture embraced by the common law concept of unity. One spouse was precluded from bringing suit against the other for personal torts,27 even when
the commission of the tort predated coverture. 5 Interspousal tort actions
also were barred when asserted after dissolution of the marriage, although
the injury could be considered by a trial court in arriving at the property
division in a divorce."
Prior to the decision in Bounds v. Caudle,3 ° the leading case in
Texas
gence); Flogel v. Flogel, 133 N.W.2d 907, 911 (Iowa 1965) (automobile negligence); Morrissett
v. Morrissett, 397 P.2d 184, 185 (Nev. 1964) (automobile negligence).
23. E.g., Drake v. Drake, 177 N.W. 624, 625 (Minn. 1920) (harrassment); Austin v.
Austin, 100 So. 591, 592 (Miss. 1924) (automobile negligence); Gowin v. Gowin, 292 S.W. 211,
215 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927, judgmt adopted) (intentional infliction of emotional distress).
24. E.g., Dunbar v. San Francisco-Oakland Terminal Rys., 201 P. 330, 332 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1921) (negligence); Teague v. Fairchild, 15 S.W.2d 585, 588 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1929, judgmt adopted) (action on a debt); Bell v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 278 S.W.2d 407,
408 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (automobile negligence); Chase v.
Beard, 346 P.2d 315, 318 (Wash. 1959) (negligence). See generally Comment, Husband and
Wife Are Not One: The Marital RelationshipIn Tort Law, 43 U.M.K.C. L. REv. 334, 341-46
(1975).
25. See Comment, Intrafamily Immunity-The Doctrine and Its Present Status, 20
BAYLOR L. REV. 27, 30 (1967).
26. O'Brien v. Hilburn, 9 Tex. 297, 299 (1852); accord, Trimble v. Farmer, 157 Tex. 533,
537, 305 S.W.2d 157, 159 (1957); Richardson v. Hutchins, 68 Tex. 81, 88, 3 S.W. 276, 279-80
(1887); Borton v. Borton, 190 S.W. 192, 193 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1916, writ refd).
27. See Turner v. Turner, 385 S.W.2d 230, 232 (Tex. 1964); Donsbach v. Offield, 488
S.W.2d 494, 495-96 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1972, no writ); Wilson v. Brown, 154 S.W. 322,
324 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1912, writ ref d).
28. See Latiolais v. Latiolais, 361 S.W.2d 252, 253 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1962, writ
ref d n.r.e.).
29. See McGlothlin v. McGlothlin, 476 S.W.2d 333, 334 n.2 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1972, writ refd n.r.e.); Sykes v. Speer, 112 S.W. 422, 424 (Te. Civ. App. 1908), rev'd on
other grounds, 119 S.W. 86 (Tex. 1909) (cannot recover after divorce for torts committed
during coverture).
30. 560 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1977).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol10/iss1/12

4

Kurth: Interspousal Immunity Doctrine Will Not Bar Claims for Intentiona

19781

CASE NOTES

on interspousal tort immunity was Nickerson v. Nickerson,' in which the
supreme court dismissed an action against the husband for false imprisonment of his wife on the theory that the wife had no right of action against
her husband in tort.2 Although the opinion noted that the rationale generally advanced for barring interspousal tort actions depended upon the
common law unity concept, it was intimated that the real basis rested
upon grounds of public policy. 3 Texas decisions have relied primarily on
three public policy considerations to bar interspousal tort litigation. First,
the argument has been advanced that tort actions between spouses would
promote discord and disruption of marital and family relations."4 Another
line of decisions has relied upon the argument that interspousal tort suits
should be barred because there are two adequate remedies at law available; the injured spouse may seek relief from the marital status through
divorce, or protection from further abuse through criminal prosecution. 5
Finally, several cases have denied the right of interspousal tort action on
the ground that personal injury recoveries collected by the injured spouse
would be classified as community property, thus unjustly enriching the
tortfeasor spouse. 6
The enactment of the Texas Family Code, which altered the concept of
the wife's status in the marital relationship, represented the first major
step in Texas in the erosion of the historical basis for the doctrine of
interspousal tort immunity. 7 The Texas Supreme Court's decision in
Graham v. Franco,3" which abolished the doctrine of imputed negligence
as a bar to the separate recovery of an injured spouse and displaced some
misconceived concepts of marital property characterization, 39 laid the necessary judicial foundation for a re-examination of interspousal tort immun31. 65 Tex. 281 (1886).
32. Id. at 286.
33. Id. at 285.
34. See Latiolais v. Latiolais, 361 S.W.2d 252, 253 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1962, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
35. See Cohen v. Cohen, 66 F. Supp. 312, 312 (N.D. Tex. 1946) (applying Texas law);
Gowin v. Gowin, 292 S.W. 211, 215 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927, judgmt adopted); Sykes v.
Speer, 112 S.W. 422, 424-25 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908), rev'd on other grounds, 119 S.W. 86 (Tex.

1909).
36. See Teague v. Fairchild, 15 S.W.2d 585, 588 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929, judgmt
adopted); Bell v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 278 S.W.2d 407, 408 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Northern Tex. Traction Co. v. Hill, 297 S.W. 778, 780 (Tex. Civ.
App.-E1 Paso 1927, writ ref'd).
37. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.01(a)(3) (Vernon 1975). This section provides that a wife's
recovery for personal injury other than loss of earning capacity is her separate property. Id.
Section 4.04 provides that a wife may sue or be sued without joinder of her husband and
section 5.21 gives the wife sole management, control, and disposition of her separate estate.
Id. §§ 4.04, 5.21.
38. 488 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. 1972).
39. Id. at 397.
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ity.4 The progressive trend toward greater judicial recognition of the wife's
expanding legal rights in the marital relationship continued in the supreme
court decision of Schwing v. Bluebonnet Express, Inc.4 The Schwing opinion announced that the contributory negligence of the surviving spouse
does not bar recovery by other statutory beneficiaries of the deceased
spouse in an action against a third party tortfeasor under the Texas Wrongful Death Statute." Thus, the supreme court's decision in Graham, which
reclassified personal injury recoveries as the separate property of the injured spouse, and the subsequent decision in Schwing, removed the
"'community property defense" that previously had represented a major
obstacle to the abrogation of the interspousal tort immunity rule.4"
In Bounds v. Caudle" the Texas Supreme Court abolished the rule of
interspousal tort immunity insofar as it would bar interspousal claims
founded on willful or intentional torts. 5 The court noted that there had
been substantial changes in the laws defining the marital relationship
since the interspousal immunity doctrine had last been examined. 6 The
recently enacted Family Code provides in section 4.04 that a woman can
sue or be sued without the joinder of her husband.47 Section 5.01(a)(3) of
the code provides that a wife's personal injury recovery, except for the
portion representing lost earning capacity, is her separate property.48 The
wife also has been given sole management, control, and disposition of her
separate estate in section 5.21 of the code.4" In view of these changes, the
court felt that the common law basis for the immunity doctrine, the fic40. Contributory negligence of the husband with respect to an automobile accident was
held not to bar the separate recovery by the wife for injuries she sustained in the accident.
The recovery for personal injuries by the wife, including disfigurement and physical pain and
suffering, determined to be the separate property of the wife in article 4615, was held to be
constitutional. Id. at 397.
The wife's right in the security of her person, brought into the marital relationship at its
inception, was held to be the separate and individual property of the wife based on the
Spanish community property concept of onerous title. The personal injury recovery was
reasoned to be the replacement of separate property brought into the marriage by the wife,insofar as practicable, and not the acquisition of an asset by the community estate. Id. at 39495.
41. 489 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. 1973).
42. Id. at 281.
43. "Cases which have ... used the community property defense ('imputed negligence')
are therefore wrong and should be overruled." Graham v. Franco, 488 S.W.2d 390, 397 (Tex.
1972); see Schwing v. Bluebonnett Express, Inc., 489 S.W.2d 279, 280-81 (Tex. 1973). See
generally Comment, Husband and Wife Are Not One: The MaritalRelationship in Tort Law,
43 U.M.K.C. L. REv. 334, 341-46 (1975).
44. 560 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1977).
45. Id. at 927.
46. Id. at 927.
47. TEX. FAm. CODE ANN. § 4.04 (Vernon 1975).

48. Id. § 5.01(a)(3).
49. Id. § 5.21.
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tional unity of the marriage partners, was no longer valid." In light of the
invalidity of the common law rationale, the court questioned whether public interest necessitated the continuation of the doctrine. While recognizing
a paramount interest in maintaining the harmony of the family relationship, the court nevertheless indicated that such harmony would not be
further impaired by allowing interspousal tort actions where one spouse
had already committed a physical assault upon the other.5' The court,
therefore, found no compelling reason to continue the doctrine of interspousal immunity insofar as it barred intentional tort actions between
spouses. 2
The abrogation of interspousal immunity for intentional torts by the
Texas Supreme Court in Bounds represents the modernization of Texas
marital relations law.53 As noted in the opinion, the recent promulgation
of the Texas Family Code has effectively provided women with legal parity
in the marital relationship. 4 In reaffirming the invalidity of the common
law concept of spousal unity expressed in Nickerson,55 the court in Bounds
scrutinizedthe public policy argument that interspousal tort suits would
create undue strain and animosity in the conjugal relationship." Justice
Barrow, speaking for the court, noted that "[tihe peace and harmony of
a home which has already been strained to the point where an intentional
physical attack could take place will not be further impaired by allowing
a suit to be brought to recover damages for the attack."5 Although the
opinion did not address the public policy justification that other adequate
remedies exist in the form of divorce or criminal prosecution," there is little
reasonable support for such a position as the basis for perpetuation of
interspousal tort immunity." Divorce ends the relationship, while criminal
prosecution exacts punishment or revenge; neither, however, compensate
50. Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925, 927 (Tex. 1977).
51. Id. at 927.
52. Id. at 927.
53. The majority of jurisdictions have now abrogated the doctrine of interspousal immunity to some extent. The decisions are collected in Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 632 (1955).
54. Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925, 927 (Tex. 1977).
55. Nickerson v. Nickerson, 65 Tex. 281, 285 (1886).
56. Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925, 927 (Tex. 1977). The Massachusetts Supreme
Court has noted:
When the rationales which gave meaning and coherence to a judicially created rule
are no longer vital, and the rule itself is not consonant with the needs of contemporary
society, a court not only has the authority but also the duty to re-examine its precedents rather than to apply by rote an antiquated formula.
Lewis v. Lewis, 351 N.E.2d 526, 531 (Mass. 1976).
57. Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925, 927 (Tex. 1977).
58. See id. at 927. See also Gowin v. Gowin, 292 S.W. 211, 215 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927,
judgmt adopted) (adequate remedy at law).
59. See Courtney v. Courtney, 87 P.2d 660, 666 (Okla. 1938); Freehe v. Freehe, 500 P.2d
771, 775 (Wash. 1972).
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for the present injury and the loss of maintenance or support. 0
Despite the significance of Bounds, some important questions are left
unanswered by the decision. The opinion clearly limits the holding to
intentional torts in "similar cases,"'" leaving intact the bar against interspousal tort actions based on negligent conduct. The court has given no
indication of how narrowly the phrase "similar cases" is to be interpreted.
The holding might be understood to apply to all intentional torts, or only
to those intentional torts resulting in the death of the injured spouse so as
to create a cause of action for wrongful death."2 In view of the holding by
the supreme court in Graham, and the later case of Schwing, a more liberal
reading of Bounds' applicability appears to be justified. 3
In distinguishing intentional from negligent interspousal torts, the opinion has disregarded entirely the extent of the injury suffered and the interest invaded. 4 Instead, the court focused on the state of mind of the wrongdoer, ignoring the plight of a negligently injured spouse seeking compensation. This distinction seems to be inconsistent with the modern foundation
of tort law, which is concerned foremost with compensation for injury and
only secondarily with punishment. 5 The first question in a given case
should be whether there has been unprivileged conduct of a tortious nature." If so, the potential liability for an alleged tortious breach of duty
between spouses should be the same as if the partners were strangers. 7 The
relationship, per se, should not bar any action. 8 The nature of the injury
60. See Crowell v. Crowell, 105 S.E. 206, 209 (N.C. 1920) (inadequacy of criminal prosecution); Courtney v. Courtney, 87 P.2d 660, 666 (Okla. 1938). See also McCurdy, Torts
Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARv. L. REV. 1030, 1052 (1930).
61. Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925, 927 (Tex. 1977).
62. It should be noted that a number of jurisdictions, while declining to fully abrogate
interspousal immunity for intentional torts, have instead chosen to allow such actions in cases
where death has ended the marital relation, and a wrongful death action has been brought
against the surviving tortfeasor spouse. See, e.g., Welch v. Davis, 101 N.E.2d 547, 551 (Ill.
1951); Deposit Guar. Bank & Trust Co. v. Nelson, 54 So. 2d 476, 477 (Miss. 1951); Rodney v.
Staman, 89 A.2d 313, 315 (Pa. 1952); Johnson v. Ottomeier, 275 P.2d 723, 725 (Wash. 1954).
63. Compare Graham v. Franco, 488 S.W.2d 390, 397 (Tex. 1972) and Schwing v. Bluebonnet Express, Inc., 489 S.W.2d 279, 280-81 (Tex. 1973) with Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d
925, 927 (Tex. 1977).
64. Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925, 927 (Tex. 1977).
65. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 1, at 6 (4th ed. 1971).
66. See McCurdy, Personal Injury Torts Between Spouses, 4 VILL. L. REv. 303, 338
(1959). See also Klein v. Klein, 376 P.2d 70, 72, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102, 104 (1962); Rogers v.
Yellowstone Park Co., 539 P.2d 566, 570 (Idaho 1974); Brooks v. Robinson, 284 N.E.2d 794,
796-97 (Ind. 1972).
67. See Klein v. Klein, 376 P.2d 70, 72, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102, 104 (1962); Rupert v. Stienne,
528 P.2d 1013, 1016 (Nev.1974); Freehe v. Freehe, 500 P.2d 771, 777 (Wash. 1972).
68. See Freehe v. Freehe, 500 P.2d 771, 777 (Wash. 1972). In addition to the continuing
judicial bar on interspousal negligence actions, the Texas Guest Statute presents a further
obstacle to an interspousal negligence action arising from an automobile accident by creating
a lesser duty or standard of care between spouses than that required between unrelated
persons. The Guest Statute provides in pertinent part that no passenger who is related within
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suffered is not mitigated because the plaintiff is married to the tortfeasor 5
If the negligence action is denied, the injured spouse may be without an
adequate remedy. In such a case, the expense of caring for an injured
spouse must of necessity come from the family's own financial resources,
yet the average citizen surely anticipates that his liability insurance will
protect him in the event his negligence injures another.7"
While the court in Bounds recognized the fallacy of the contention that
marital harmony would be disturbed by interspousal suits based on intentional torts,7' decisions from other jurisdictions have noted that the argument is similarly groundless when applied to negligent torts.72 As a practical matter, the real defendant in a negligence suit is often an insurance
company.73 Thus, there is little danger that litigation by one spouse against
the other for injuries sustained as the-result of the tortfeasor's alleged
negligence will result in disruption of the family relationship."
The most common ground for barring interspousal negligence actions
rests upon the fear that the close'relationship of the parties will encourage
fraud and collusion against the tortfeasor's insurance carrier.7 5 The Texas
Supreme Court considered this argument in Felderhoff v. Felderhoff,6
where it noted that the possibility of fraud and collusion is present in all
liability insurance cases.77 Although the opinion conceded that such suits
presented good cause for additional caution in examining the particular
facts of each case, the court held that there was "no reason for denial of a
cause of action in all cases in which a close relationship exists between the
the second degree of affinity to the operator of a motor vehicle may maintain a cause of action
against the operator unless he was guilty of gross negligence. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
6701b, § 1(a) (Vernon 1977).
69. See, e.g., Brooks v. Robinson, 284 N.E.2d 794, 795-96 (Ind. 1972); Courtney v.
Courtney, 87 P.2d 660, 661 (Okla. 1938); Graham v. Franco, 488 S.W.2d 390, 393-94 (Tex.
1972).
70. See Sorensen v. Sorensen, 339 N.E.2d 907, 914 (Mass. 1975) (parent-child immunity); Immer v. Risko, 267 A.2d 481, 484-85 (N.J. 1970).
71. Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925, 927 (Tex. 1977).
72. See Lewis v. Lewis, 351 N.E.2d 526, 529 (Mass. 1976); Ruppert v. Stienne, 528 P.2d
1013, 1016 (Nev.1974); Courtney v. Courtney, 87 P.2d 660, 667 (Okla. 1938).
73. See, e.g., Courtney v. Courtney, 87 P.2d 660, 668 (Okla. 1938); Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928, 932 (Tex. 1971) (parent-child immunity); Richard v. Richard, 300 A.2d
637, 641 (Vt. 1973).
74. See Klein v. Klein, 376 P.2d 70, 72, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102, 104 (1962); Rogers v. Yellowstone Park Co., 539 P.2d 566, 569 (Idaho 1974); Richard v. Richard, 300 A.2d 637, 641 (Vt.
1973).
75. See Klein v. Klein, 376 P.2d 70, 76, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102, 108 (1962) (dissenting opinion);
Newton v. Weber, 196 N.Y.S. 113, 114 (Sup. Ct. 1922); Smith v. Smith, 287 P.2d 572, 583
(Ore. 1955).
76. 473 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. 1971). Injured by the negligence of his father in the operation
of farm machinery, an unemancipated minor son sued his father in his occupational capacity
as a member of a farming partnership and was permitted recovery on the partnership liability
insurance. Id. at 933.
77. Id. at 932.
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insured and the injured party.""8 Under provisions ordinarily included in
an insurance policy, the insurer has the right to disclaim liability when
there are inconsistent or contradictory statements by the insured or when
collusion between the insured and the injured party results in false statements to the insurance company." Any overt attempt at collusion constitutes a criminal offense and would be punished as such."0
The proposition that there are other adequate remedies for the injured
spouse to pursue simply has no realistic justification as a bar to interspousal negligence actions. Ordinary negligence is nowhere a crime or a
ground for divorce.8 The decisions in Graham and Schwing have effectively repudiated the community property defense. 2 The only rationale
upon which the court could base a continued refusal to abrogate the bar
to interspousal negligence actions rests upon the argument that such a
change is solely within the province of the legislature.83 This argument has
not proven persuasive, having been rejected in numerous decisions from
other jurisdictions.8" The rule originally emanated from the courts during
a period in the history of the common law when its result was consistent
with the contemporary trend of legal thought regarding the unity of husband and wife,"2 and thus should be abrogated today as an unjustifiable
concept inconsistent with modern tort theories of compensation.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that because of the normal, incidental,
physical contacts of the marital relation, some tort actions which could be
maintained if the partners were strangers, should not be allowed between
78. Id. at 932. The court commented:
We believe that our laws and judicial system are adequate to ferret out and prevent
collusion if and when proper allegations and proof are presented in a particular case
without the necessity of adopting an absolute immunity rule which would apply to this
and all other cases'in which no collusion is alleged.
Id. at 932.
79. See Griffin v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 273 F.2d 45, 48 (5th Cir. 1959) (applying Texas
law) (need to prove actual prejudice); Williams v. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 N.E.2d 378, 381
(Mass. 1953). In Frazier v. Glens Falls Indem. Co., 278 S.W.2d 388, 392 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.) the court held that under the cooperation clause of an automobile liability policy, the insured owed to the insurer an affirmative duty to make a full, frank,
and fair disclosure to the insurer of the facts of the accident, and a negative duty to refrain
from any fraudulent or collusive act which might operate to the prejudice of the insurer in
the conduct of a defense against, or settlement of a claim against the insured. Id. at 392.
80. See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
81. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 122, at 862-63 & n.45 (4th ed. 1971).
82. Schwing v. Bluebonnet Express, Inc., 489 S.W.2d 279, 281 (Tex. 1973); Graham v.
Franco, 488 S.W.2d 390, 397 (Tex. 1972).
83. See, e.g, Wright v. Wright, 70 S.E.2d 152, 154 (Ga. Ct. App. 1952); Ensminger v.
Ensminger, 77 So. 2d 308, 310 (Miss. 1955); Willott v. Willott, 62 S.W.2d 1084, 1085-86 (Mo.
1933).
84. See, e.g., Beaudette v. Frana, 173 N.W.2d 416, 419 (Minn. 1969); Immer v. Riskol
267 A.2d 481, 483 (N.J. 1970); Freehe v. Freehe, 500 P.2d 771, 775 (Wash. 1972).
85. See Brooks v. Robinson, 284 N.E.2d 794, 797 (Ind. 1972); Lewis v. Lewis, 351 N.E.2d
526, 527 (Mass. 1976); Freehe v. Freehe, 500 P.2d 771, 773 (Wash. 1972).
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spouses. 6 Reason dictates that there must exist a carefully circumscribed
zone of privileged conduct based on the peculiar obligations created by the
marital relation, which would encompass a range of behavior sufficient to
prohibit trivial interspousal litigation. 7 In negligent torts the nature of the
marital relationship should be treated as an element in the consideration
of what is reasonable conduct under the particular circumstances. In the
case of intentional torts, the existence of the relationship might warrant
the application of implied consent in a proper situation. "
A fundamental principle in the law of torts requires that persons injured
by the willful or negligent acts of another be compensated, absent a statute
or compelling reason to the contrary. The commentators clearly favor a
position which would never bar tort actions between husband and wife,
and would draw no distinctions between intentional and negligent conduct. 0 Bounds v. Caudle did not consider the question of whether interspousal tort actions based on negligent conduct should continue to be
prohibited, although it fairly can be ascertained from the opinion that such
a bar remains in full effect.8 Examination of decisions from Texas and
other jurisdictions indicates, however, that arguments advanced as justification for the continued ban of interspousal negligence suits have not
withstood judicial scrutiny. 2 The universal policy of compensating those
injured as a result of another's tortious conduct would seem to require that
any rule avoiding this policy must advance at least an equally important
interest. Perhaps the Texas Supreme Court will act to abrogate the continuing bar to interspousal negligence actions when a proper case is presented.
86. See Bushnell v. Bushnell, 131 A. 432, 433 (Conn. 1925); Lewis v. Lewis, 351 N.E.2d
526, 532 (Mass. 1976); Courtney v. Courtney, 87 P.2d 660, 669 (Okla. 1938).
87. See Beaudette v. Frana, 173 N.W.2d 416, 420 (Minn. 1969); Courtney v. Courtney,
87 P.2d 660, 667-68 (Okla. 1938); Fiedeer v. Fiedeer, 140 P. 1022, 1025 (Okla. 1914).
88. See Beaudette v. Frana, 173 N.W.2d 416, 420 (Minn. 1969), in which the Supreme
Court of Minnesota commented:
There is an intimate sharing of contact within the marriage relationship, both intentional and unintentional, that is uniquely unlike the exposure among strangers. The
risks of intentional contact in marriage are such that one spouse should not recover
damages from the other without [proof] that the injurious contact was . . . a gross
abuse of normal privilege.
89. Klein v. Klein, 376 P.2d 70, 72, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102, 104 (1962). See also Rupert v.
Stienne, 528 P.2d 1013, 1016 (Nev. 1974).
90. See generally H. CLARK, LAW OF DoMEsTic RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 9.1, at

252-56 (1968); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OFTORTS § 122, at 861-64 (4th ed. 1971);
Albertsworth, Recognition of New Interests In the Law of Torts, 10 CAL. L. REV. 461, 471-80
(1922); McCurdy, Personal Injury Torts Between Spouses, 4 VILL. L. REv. 303 (1959);
McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HAsv. L. REV. 1030, 1053 (1930);
Sanford, Personal Torts Within the Family, 9 VAND. L. REV. 823, 829 (1956). Butsee Rheinstein, Challenge and Response in Family Law, 17 VAND. L. REV. 239, 246-50 (1963).
91. 560 S.W.2d 925, 927 (Tex. 1977).
92. See, e.g, Klein v. Klein, 376 P.2d 70, 72, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102, 104 (1962); Lewis v. Lewis,
351 N.E.2d 526, 531 (Mass. 1976); Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928, 932 (Tex. 1971).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

11

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 10 [2022], No. 1, Art. 12

216

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 10

The interspousal tort immunity rule was based originally on the common
law fictional unity of husband and wife, and thus having judicial origins,
the doctrine is likewise subject to judicial modification or abrogation. The
court bears the responsibility when applying the doctrine to scrutinize its
continued justification carefully, in order to ensure that "the conditions
and needs of the times have not so changed as to make further application
of it the instrument of injustice.""3
Edward L. Kurth
93. State v. Culver, 129 A.2d 715, 721 (N.J. 1957).
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